Jafan 6/3 manual

While the traditional operational concern over confidentiality of classified information has not diminished, integrity and availability have become critical parts of security for all systems. The requirements in this manual reflect that understanding. The operational elements of a government organization have, in the past, been concerned with and fiscally responsible for ensuring the integrity and availability of the information on the system.

While this manual describes requirements for ensuring the integrity and availability of the system and of the information on it, nothing in this manual shall be construed to state or imply that there has been a transfer of fiscal responsibility to the security element s from the operational element s.

This manual establishes the security requirements for all applicable systems. Accrediting authorities may establish additional security measures, if deemed appropriate. Any such measures shall comply with the relevant references listed in this manual. Background United States intelligence information has three attributes that require protection: confidentiality, integrity, and availability.

The degree of emphasis on each varies with the type of information processed and the mission of the organization responsible for the data.

This manual recognizes the contributions to security made by operating environments, and allows the technical safeguards of systems to be modified accordingly. For example, while encryption can be an effective way to protect the confidentiality of information during transmission, if the information passes only through areas that are approved for open storage of the information or across a protected distribution system within an inspectable space, then encryption of the information for that purpose may be unnecessary.

The requirements specified in this manual are based on the assumption that the system is otherwise protected at an appropriate level for the information processed on it. These other protections include appropriate levels of physical, personnel, communications, emanations, and technical surveillance countermeasures TSCM security, as required in other directives. System Information Collection. The following information must be collected to determine the requirements for operating a system: The category, classification, and all applicable security markings for all of the information on, or to be put on, the system; The need-to-know status of the users on the system, including their formal access approval s , clearance s , and nationality ies ; The perimeter and boundary of the system; The operating environment of the system and connecting systems, including the service provided e.

How To Use This Manual. Eleven steps are required to accredit an IS. The following summarizes those steps and in each case refers to the relevant chapter or chapters of this manual: Determine Levels-of-Concern Ch. Because all of the ISs covered by this manual process intelligence information, the Level-of-Concern rating for confidentiality is always High.

TABLE 3. Chapter 5 Availability Indicators. Chapter 6 Basic Not applicable to this manual. Reasonable degree of resis-tance required against unau-thorized modification, or loss of integrity will have an adverse effect.

Information must be available with flexible tolerance for delay, 1 or loss of availability will have an adverse effect. Medium Not applicable to this manual. High degree of resistance required against unauthorized modification, or bodily injury might result from loss of integrity, or loss of integrity will have an adverse effect on organizational-level interests.

Information must be readily available with minimum tolerance for delay, 2 or bodily injury might result from loss of availability, or loss of availability will have an ad-verse effect on organiza-tional-level interests. All Sensitive Compart-mented Information. Very high degree of resis-tance required against unau-thorized modification, or loss of life might result from loss of integrity, or loss of integrity will have an adverse effect on national-level interests, or loss of integrity will have an adverse effect on confiden-tiality.

Information must always be available upon request, with no tolerance for delay, or loss of life might result from loss of availability, or loss of availability will have an adverse effect on national-level interests, or loss of availability will have an adverse effect on confiden-tiality.

As noted in Chapter 3, the DAA must ascertain the technical security requirements and assurances for confidentiality, integrity, and availability prior to accrediting an IS. But, when applying the confidentiality requirements of this chapter the term user refers only to the direct users of the system. Procedures for controlling access by users and maintainers to IS resources, including those that are at remote locations.

Procedures can be external to the system e. Electronic means shall be employed where technically feasible. Security parameters e. If any circumstances can cause an untrusted recovery, such circumstances shall be documented and appropriate mitigating procedures shall be put in place.

Not be considered a substitute for logging out unless a mechanism actually logs out the user when the user idle time is exceeded. Notification to all users that use of the system indicates 1 the consent of the user to such monitoring and recording and 2 that unauthorized use is prohibited and subject to criminal and civil penalties.

A PDS can also provide need-to-know isolation for communications lines. These alternative methods may have similar requirements. For example, the electronically stored version of biometric authentication patterns needs to be protected, as do password authenticators. As noted in Chapter 3, the DAA must ascertain the technical security requirements and assurances for confidentiality, integrity and availability prior to accrediting an IS. TABLE 5. Level-of-Concern Integrity Factors Location In Manual Basic Reasonable degree of resistance required against unauthorized modification, or loss of integrity will have an adverse effect.

Procedures to assure the appropriate physical and technical protection of the backup and restoration hardware, firmware, and software, such as router tables, compilers, and other security-related system software. The following assurance shall be provided a system operating at a Basic Level-of-Concern for Integrity: [ Verif1 ] Verification by the ISSM that the necessary security procedures and mechanisms are in place; testing of them by the ISSM to ensure that they work appropriately.

Level-of-Concern Availability Factors Location In Manual Basic Information must be available with flexible tolerance for delay, 1 or loss of availability will have an adverse effect. Often, prevention of such attacks is handled by a controlled interface. See Chapter 7 for a discussion on controlled interfaces. This topic is further discussed in paragraph 9. Certificates are used as a way to verify the authenticity of an organization or individual.

This would include systems connected via internets, intranets, client-server local area networks LANs , etc. Also under development are tools that would search for the signatures of known malicious mobile code or executable content, in a manner analogous to the way current anti-viral software detects viruses. The half-size classification labels would be developed to accommodate new types of portable IS media that have been introduced since October In this case, the function of the ISA is handled with a list of requirements to be satisfied prior to connection.

Upon verification that the list has been satisfied, the interconnection is made. Make risk assessment recommendations. Obtain Accreditation IS is Recertified and. Donate to WikiLeaks Unless otherwise specified, the document described here: Contact us if you have specific jafn If you have a very large submission, or a submission with a complex format, or are a high-risk source, please contact us.

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