British armour in the normandy campaign 1944 pdf

Beginning with the D-day landings, this is a frank appraisal of the planned use and actual results of the deployment of armor by both German and Allied commanders in the major tank battles of the campaign including Operations Epsom, This lavishly illustrated edition is the definitive single volume overview of the hard fought campaign in Normandy.

Search Results for: the normandy campaign Home Search results for: the normandy campaign Author : Colin F. British Armor in the Normandy Campaign Post by Wokelly » 28 Jul Just finished reading it, very good book, challenges many of the more negative views of the performance of British Armor in Normandy and does a good job of discrediting them.

Written by John Buckley. Its very well written, well researhed and unbias. He does not attempt to excuse for the actual falings of the Armor, but he does an excellent job of breaking many misconceptions. If you want a priview of thje book type the threat title "British Armour in the Normandy Campaign " into google and click the first link and you will be able to read the first few pages of several chapters.

The inability of the British to launch a successful strike on Caen was a result of poor weather, optimistic planning that took too little attention of the terrain and any potential friction, and over-expectation about the ability of armour to drive inland, especially when confronted by greater levels of opposition than imagined.

Nevertheless, in the post-war period Miles Dempsey, GOC 2nd British Army, remained convinced that the capture of Caen had been possible, and that the D-Day plan should in fact have been more ambitious rather than less. Therefore, the likelihood of commanders on the spot being able to throw off such thinking and demonstrate tremendous flexibility in the face of particular difficulties and against unexpected levels of opposition was remote.

The consequences of the failure of the armoured groups in and around Caen on the first day, nevertheless, had serious effects on subsequent operations. The armoured brigades were involved in a series of further actions in the days following the invasion, actions which demonstrated emerging difficulties. The push south, however, was continually held up in confusion and frustration.

Tank crews, especially commanders, became wary of snipers, and enemy infantry armed with the panzerfaust, a throw-away shortrange hollow-charge weapon more than capable of knocking out a Sherman, also emerged as a threat. Notably, the British troops, like the Germans, proved more adept in defence than in attack, and a number of enemy armour attacks were beaten off by Allied tanks and troops. Early encounters demonstrated that commanders and troops were using a variety of different methods of working with infantry, as well as having to adapt tactics to the new situation and terrain.

It was also a problem that armoured brigades and regiments tended to be moved around between divisions, with the consequence that the units would be separated just as an understanding between commanders and troops was emerging. This was to be a problem for the independent brigades throughout the campaign. After having made good progress on the first day, the Canadians then encountered more serious opposition on 9 June. The 6th Canadian Armoured Regiment collided with German Panthers, but although heavy fighting ensued, the Sherman acquitted itself well according to Canadian tankcrew.

Henry accounted for six Panthers from seven shots. The latter, because of its timing so early in the campaign, and because it coincided with growing alarm throughout 21st Army Group about the capabilities and deficiencies of Allied tanks, has come to epitomise the failings of British armour in the final stages of the war.

Yet the Battle of Villers Bocage was just one action, and although much has been written about the defeat suffered there by 7th Armoured Division, a good deal of the commentary and analysis has suffered from hyperbole and propaganda.

In particular the role of Michael Wittmann has been widely publicised and his impressive achievements exaggerated and eulogised to the extent that accounts have often implied that one Tiger tank stopped an entire armoured division. With the failure to seize Caen on 6 June, Montgomery and Lt-Gen Miles Dempsey were presented with alternatives regarding further actions to remove the German presence from that pivotal city.

Dempsey had always been aware that the immediate seizure of Caen might prove unsuccessful, and deliberation had been given to other options. Dempsey and his staff had also been planning a more audacious operation, codenamed Wild Oats that called for a dashing drive by armoured forces to the west of Caen, supposed ultimately to meet up with 1st Airborne Division, which was to be dropped to the south of the city. A further effort to the east of Caen would see 51st Highland Division, supported by armour, break out from the bridgehead and also join up with 1st Airborne.

Wild Oats was to occupy the planning staff of 2nd Army in the immediate aftermath of the invasion, but foundered on the opposition of Air Marshal Trafford Leigh-Mallory, the Allied air commander, and the unfolding situation. A key component was to be the effort of 7th Armoured Division in precipitating the western breakout, but in order to co-ordinate the whole effort and to have the appropriate level of logistical support, Wild Oats was delayed.

Moreover, the prospects for Wild Oats were poor and were to fade rapidly with the stalled progress of both 7th Armoured and 51st Highland Divisions. By this time, Erskine was becoming frustrated by the inactivity. He believed that Perch could have been initiated some 24 hours before it was and that valuable time had been frittered away in spurious planning.

The flanking advance began on 12 June at hours but was held up at Livry, and by the late evening Hinde had decided to hold his position for fear of displaying his intentions to the Germans. With two squadrons, the regimental HQ elements and attending supports stretched out through Villers and up to Point , the British force was assaulted by five Tiger tanks of st Heavy Tank Battalion. He was eventually driven out by the prospect of further duelling with a Sherman Firefly equipped with a pdr gun.

The units of 4CLY trapped on the road up to Point were whittled away as the morning went on and were captured by early afternoon. However, Erskine still saw opportunities on the following day if he could be reinforced quickly, especially with infantry.

Bucknall arguably misread the position and merely attempted to push from the north to reach Villers with 50th Division and supporting elements. Notably, the Germans, attacking across small high-banked fields encountered all the problems confronting the Allies, while the troops of the 7th Armoured for once enjoyed the advantages conferred by the terrain. Indeed, a frustrated Dempsey described the prosecution of the whole operation as a disgrace.

Moreover, the notion that a reduced armoured brigade 22nd Armoured Brigade had left one of its three regiments with the divisional infantry brigade , with only limited mobile infantry and artillery support, could achieve a decisive penetration in the face of hardening opposition was optimistic. Hinde also pointed to difficulties of operating in close country and the density and quality of the enemy forces. He further complained about the inadequacies of British tanks, arguing that Shermans and Cromwells were no match for Tigers and Panthers.

Indeed, although British losses were heavy, with some plus vehicles being written off, German losses were also significant, with six or so very valuable Tigers being lost, along with other forces. Michael Reynolds widens the net and is critical of British command generally. However, although Wittmann displayed great bravery and daring in leading his attack, the roots of the failure at Villers Bocage are broader and deeper. This was a failure on the part of the British rather than a demonstration of superior German armour.

Indeed, when German tanks went on to the offensive in Villers later on 13 June they too displayed poor armour—infantry co-operation. When Wittmann was fired upon by a Firefly, he prudently withdrew. In addition st Infantry Brigade, in Corps reserve, was also capable of being deployed.

Therefore, infantry was available, but was not as fully engaged as it should have been. First, operational command demanded and expected great dash and boldness from 7th Armoured and methods of fighting supposedly akin to blitzkrieg. In essence, once 22nd Armoured Brigade was through the gap in the German lines the whole operation appeared to be an archetypal armoured exploitation.

In reality, the penetration was weak, and the unwillingness of Bucknall in particular to support the attack when problems developed undermined the whole operation. However, the second and perhaps most pertinent factor in the failure was an inadequate linking of force structure to circumstance.

More than any other armoured division in the British Army, the 7th was prepared for mobile operations in exploitation of opportunities and breakthroughs, yet the events of 12 June indicated not a break-through so much as an evasion of heavy combat. Stalled in front of Tilly by Panzer Lehr, 7th Armoured attempted to replace direct assault with manoeuvre, not in itself an inappropriate stratagem, but one which required forceful and determined leadership, along with closely co-ordinated combined arms tactics.

Operation Epsom, 26—30 June Over the next two weeks or so Anglo-Canadian armour aided the expansion of the bridgehead still further, but 21st Army Group was planning a much more ambitious use of the growing strength of 2nd British Army. After the debacle of Operation Perch, Montgomery reverted to his preferred methods of employing large-scale, properly prepared set-piece battles to achieve his objectives.

On the left, I Corps was to occupy Carpiquet, which also offered an observation point over the battlefield, before pushing on to Caen itself. The main thrust by VIII Corps, however, was to come from two infantry divisions 15th Scottish and 43rd Wessex , an armoured division 11th , an armoured brigade 4th and a tank brigade 31st , totalling over tanks.

Artillery support from some guns would be available and a significant level of air support was to be provided. The armour was to be used in the classic manner, with the heavy infantry Churchill tanks of 31st Tank Brigade closely supporting the 15th Scottish in the initial assault, to be supported by the 43rd Wessex with the Sherman-equipped 4th Armoured Brigade under command.

Ultimately, when the moment was ripe, 11th Armoured Division would be released to exploit the penetration and burst into the Orne Valley.

Still further, the terrain was dense and undulating, limiting the rate of advance and creating great difficulties for the attackers.

Finally, the quality of the German defence was rapidly supplemented by quantity as units were fed into the line in a desperate attempt to prevent a British breakout. In close support of 15th Scottish they advanced on a two-mile front, making fair progress, but the inexperience of the two formations, which had never worked together before, soon told.

Consequently, the largely inexperienced armoured division, commanded by Maj-Gen Pip Roberts, was ordered to attack. On the following day, further progress was made and on 28 June Hill was seized and held for a time by 11th Armoured Division, whose officers also believed that further progress could be made.

Epsom had failed in its main aim of breaking though to the Orne Valley, though it had undermined the German ability to prepare a major counterattack in the area, as arriving reinforcements had to be fed piecemeal into the battle to block British progress.

Moreover, when the Germans had once again gone on to the counter-offensive, as they did on 27 June and again on Hill on 1 July, they were repulsed with heavy losses. The Churchills of 31st Tank Brigade had displayed poor co-ordination with the infantry they were designed and trained to support, though this can be partly mitigated by the units not having worked together prior to 26 June. Finally, 4th Armoured Brigade, an experienced unit, had also struggled when called into action to support a drive towards Hill The command structure of the brigade was hit with the death of its CO, Brig.

In addition, 79th Armoured was to provide three squadrons of close support armour, in particular a squadron of flame-throwing Churchill Crocodiles. The assault struggled to make headway against determined opposition, but the village of Carpiquet was seized, though the airfield remained stubbornly out of reach. During an attack from Marcelet by the Royal Winnipeg Rifles, the supporting armour stood off and attempted to shoot the infantry on to target from static positions, but failed to provide adequate close support.

It was not until early afternoon that armour advanced to aid the offensive. The Allies came off worst, with one Panther commander claiming six Shermans in the firefight, and it may well be the case that no German tank was irretrievably lost.

Once again, although some progress had been made, an infantry brigade and two armoured regiments, amply supported by artillery, naval and air power, had been stymied by a much smaller force of less than one battalion, a company of tanks and six 88 mm guns. Operation Charnwood, 8—11 July Montgomery and Dempsey now sought to remove the German presence from Caen by means of a fully fledged set piece assault. Attempts to flank the city to the west and east had failed, but the pressing need to seize Caen remained.

The armoured brigades employed were to be 2nd Canadian and 27th Armoured. The RAF had been concerned about friendly fire casualties and thus unloaded their bombs some 6, yards ahead of the British lines, but this overshot most of the German troops and equipment and merely wrecked Caen, hindering later use of the road network by Allied armour and vehicles.

Progress had been made and the first use of massed heavy air power had indicated what might be possible if technique and co-ordination could be improved. By the time Charnwood had ground to a halt, the Germans, despite having been forced to surrender part of Caen, were dug-in in strength on the south side of the River Orne and the open country to the south was still denied to 21st Army Group.

Once again the objective was to seize Hill and Maltot and then unleash armoured forces into the Orne Valley. The exploitation role was to be undertaken by 4th Armoured Brigade, commanded by Michael Carver. The initial advance towards the summit of Hill began in the early hours of 10 July and was conducted by 4th Somerset Light Infantry supported by the heavily armoured Churchill infantry tanks of 7th Royal Tank Regiment 7RTR.

Despite the infantry losing three of their four company commanders, they fought their way to the crest but were stopped by anti-tank guns and recently arrived Tigers of nd SS Heavy Tank Battalion deployed on the reverse slope.

Despite considerable superiority in tanks, infantry and firepower the Allies had failed to drive the dwindling troops of I and II SS Panzer Corps from the route to the Orne. The Allied armour had been forced to make frontal and at times inadequately supported attacks on strong defensive positions, and with German anti-tanks guns and Tigers in particular taking up strong reverse slope positions, the capture of Hill was always going to be difficult.

To the east, in and around Maltot and Eterville, a series of to-and-fro engagements had yielded little, but had further reinforced the view that even the Germans, when provoked into localised counter-attacks, suffered heavy casualties, especially from Allied artillery and anti-tank guns. Jupiter also further exposed the problem of congestion for Allied armour, an issue already noted at Epsom, and one that would continue to plague tank commanders in Normandy. In one action, at a range of just yards, a tank of the Royal Scots Greys hit a Panther four times with its 75 mm gun only to see the shells bounce off harmlessly.

The Allied approach was sustainable and logical, largely because the German method was not. However, such clarity of understanding in how armour could and should be used was not to be displayed a few days later to the east of Caen. Criticism has been heaped on British armour tactics, command, and on the Allied tanks, which were outgunned and under-armoured for such an assault.

Whilst much of the furore over the failure of Goodwood centres on the political and high-level command pressures and squabbles involving Montgomery, Eisenhower and Tedder, there is little doubt that a good deal of controversy surrounds the operation itself and in explaining why it did not achieve all that it might. It is therefore instructive and useful to analyse the role and employment of armour in the operation.

With the Americans bogged down and preparing for their next breakout attempt, to be Cobra, Dempsey persuaded Montgomery to back an ambitious all-armoured corps operation to the east of Caen.

At the very least, Goodwood was to be a major multi-corps operation involving the use of massed strategic bombers and political expectations were therefore high. However, Goodwood was a flawed plan, poorly executed and with little chance of success when it was launched on the morning of 18 July.

Most importantly, it demonstrated an inadequate appreciation of the role and capabilities of armoured divisions. They were not constructed to act as battering rams to lead a penetration and their force structure was accordingly ill-suited to an operation such as Goodwood, where the armour was to lead the attack.

In some ways Goodwood mirrored Epsom in that the armoured division was to be used to breakthrough, not exploit an opportunity, the role actually envisaged for them in pre-D-Day planning and training. However, Goodwood went much further in flouting the basic principles of armoured warfare as they pertained in Montgomery had for some time argued strongly against the employment of an all-armoured corps, largely because of difficult experiences in the Mediterranean campaign.

The major difficulty facing an armoured division acting independently centred on the low levels of infantry support available, there being just one motor battalion in the whole armoured brigade of an armoured division in Operation Goodwood also suffered unduly from poor all-arms co-ordination, partly a product of the nature of the plan, but which impacted severely on the armoured regiments.

The speed and distance over which the Allied armour had advanced outpaced artillery support, the mobile elements of which were still struggling to get across the congested bridges over the River Orne and the Caen Canal. Moreover, air support also faded, despite the tremendous effects of the initial heavy bombardment. There is certainly a degree of misfortune over this incident, but the fact that only one FAC was allotted to the leading brigade of this major operation was a major error in judgement and planning.

The Goodwood plan also demonstrated a poor understanding of the employment of armour in terms of manoeuvring space. Attempting to push three armoured divisions across six bridges in the space of a few hours, partly in darkness, was ambitious enough, but the frontage of the assault was to be just 2, yards, initially along narrow lanes cleared through minefields and then across bomb-cratered terrain.

Whatever the advantages of a narrow-front assault, the problems it created for armour were nowhere better exposed than Operation Goodwood. Previous operations had made effective use of defensive positions and firepower to defeat German counter-attacks and inflict heavy casualties, as part of the overarching policy of writing down the enemy. A more defensive posture using available terrain may have limited British losses while still provoking the Germans into costly counter-attack.

Moreover, the tactical considerations for British armour in Goodwood were considerable and quite alarming. Tony Sargeaunt, the tank expert attached to No. The final stages would be fought across a flat and open area of some 4, yards, which would offer the static anti-tank gunnery of the Germans a huge advantage whilst denying British armour any cover or hull-down firing positions.

Allied tank guns attempting to knock out camouflaged enemy anti-tank guns needed to be at a range of some yards or less to have a fair chance of rapid success. At ranges of some 2, yards, however, it would take Shermans and Cromwells some 15 rounds of high explosive HE to eliminate the target.

Even with multiple tanks engaging the enemy, it was probable that four or five Allied tanks would be knocked out in the process. The main objective was to tie down high-quality German forces in the east, maintain Anglo-Canadian pressure and perhaps push into the Falaise Plain in an expanded multi-corps endgame.

However, any expanded follow-up to Spring was effectively doomed from the start. Nevertheless, Spring was conceived as a holding operation first and foremost and the Guards Armoured Division were under clear instructions not to take too many risks, while Erskine at 7th Armoured had already indicated that he saw little benefit in charging Cromwells and Shermans at heavily defended German positions.

Moreover, criticism can be levelled at Montgomery for allowing II Canadian Corps to be committed to an action where progress was doubtful, was therefore unlikely to tie down German forces, and consequently would fail to pin German resources, let alone offer hope of a more decisive penetration.

The level of firepower support for Spring was less than that expected by the Germans, to such an extent that they remained sceptical as to whether this was a serious operation. Nevertheless, although the heavy bomber fleets were assigned to Cobra, Spring enjoyed medium bomber and substantial artillery support.

However, the ground assaults were much too weak, with the armour of 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade too dispersed to make considerable progress, despite the valiant efforts of the troops. Co-ordination of that regiment with its attached tank support, provided by a squadron of Fort Garry Horse Shermans, was poor, with the infantry becoming separated and the tanks being held back by Panthers mingling with the advancing troops. The Shermans lost 11 of 16 tanks, whilst the battalion suffered casualties.

There is little doubt that the operation was a disappointment on many levels and had signally failed in its primary objectives. Allied armour had been too thinly dispersed, though this mirrored the whole approach to the operation, and arguably 22nd Armoured Brigade had yet again displayed the scars of Villers Bocage.

It also exemplified the advantages of close armour—infantry co-operation, and that flexible and adaptable units and commanders could cope with even a hastily mounted operation such as Bluecoat. Indeed, Dempsey was not issued with the directive to strike south in support of Bradley until 27 July, just three days before the launch of the assault.

After two days 7th Armoured was still five miles short of its objective, Aunay-sur-Odon. The newly arrived 6th Guards Tank Brigade, commanded by Brig. Gerald Verney, won many plaudits for its closely co-ordinated work with the now battle-hardened 15th Scottish Infantry Division. Both Roberts 11th Armoured and Adair Guards divided their divisions into two brigade groups, each with infantry battalions and armoured regiments in mutually supporting combinations.

Such a restructuring proved highly successful. Adair modified the structure later in August and retained it throughout the rest of the campaign, while Roberts employed it more flexibly, but settled with it following the capture of Antwerp. Casualties throughout Bluecoat were high, but progress was made and the first objective of pinning and writing down German troops in the British sector, in the most difficult circumstances of the campaign, was largely achieved.

Moreover, British armoured forces were in some cases demonstrating that lessons were being absorbed and applied to the battlefield. Operation Totalise, 7—10 August With terrific American progress in the west following the Cobra-led breakout, 21st Army Group endeavoured to make its contribution to the looming envelopment of the German armies in France. Totalise, as it was to be codenamed, included many innovations, intended by Simonds to rectify the operational difficulties thus far encountered by the Anglo-Canadian forces.

First, Simonds was keen to effect surprise and thus prevent the Germans being able to stymie the attempted break-through by their being aware too soon of the nature and intentions of 21st Army Group assaults. Ample use of air power was factored in to compensate for this, and to offer firepower support to the leading echelons when they had outpaced the less mobile artillery. Second, Totalise was to retain momentum and not get bogged down. His plan addressed this concern in three ways. First, air power would play a more complete and integrated role by providing firepower support deep into German-held territory, just at the moment when the effectiveness of Allied artillery would be waning.

Second, the depth of German defences had continually confounded Allied efforts, and therefore Totalise was to be a two-stage plan, with the second phase, particularly a second aerial bombardment, intended to breach the main German defensive line. Such vehicles would keep pace with the armour cross-country and would sustain the tempo of Allied operations. With these factors in place, Simonds hoped to achieve a breakthrough, at which point his two armoured divisions would be unleashed in the exploitation role.

In view of the weakness of the German forces holding the sector, and the overwhelming strength of the Allied units to be hurled at them, prospects looked good for Totalise. However, the plan was undone because of its own flaws and the rapidity of the German response.